It cannot be the purpose of this article to review all the questions raised by the memorandum. Our purpose is more modest, namely to present evidence partly with the help of new sources, on three main aspects. These are first the question of the authenticity of the text, and unless there is confidence about that clearly all speculation is arid; second the development of Hitler's views on foreign policy in 1936-37, particularly his view of Britain which is of pivotal importance; and third a comparison of his views with those held by his audience on 5 November 1937. It is obvious that the importance of what Hitler said on that occasion can only be understood by placing it in the context of what other leading figures in the Third Reich thought about the same matters. The background to the meeting on 5 November 1937 in terms of the immediate dispute over rearmament, and the longer running dispute over the control of the war economy between Schacht and Blomberg on one side and Goring on the other, will not be described in detail because our sources do not add significantly to the established picture 4 . It is necessary therefore to state at the outset, that we do not accept the argument that because the meeting was called to discuss rearmament, it had no bearing on foreign policy. The crisis in the rearmament programme and the problems of Schacht's resignation and succession were intimately involved with foreign policy. It was because of Hitler's commitment to expansion that he would brook no delay in rearmament and this had sparked the domestic crisis. Without the success of rearmament within the specified period, his foreign policy would become impracticable. There is therefore no logic in treating the domestic crisis as an autonomous phenomenon and using it to discredit the importance of what Hitler said. On the contrary, domestic and foreign policy were inter-dependent. The changing fortunes of individuals in the internal power struggles of 1936-38 are symptomatic of that inter-dependence. This suggests a further dimension to the meeting on 5 November 1937, namely a stage in the assertion of Hitler's authority over his subordinates. This aspect will be considered in detail in the comparison of his views with those of his audience. Hitherto, he had taken charge of individual decisions such as the Polish non-aggression pact, the naval agreement with Britain and the management of the crisis of the «occupation of the Rhineland. But never before had he challenged his senior professional advisers so fundamentally with his own foreign policy, backed by his own judgement of international politics and strategic opportunities. Again, there seems no reason to doubt that the meeting marked a crucial stage in the definition of the »Führer state« 5 .
I. The authenticity of the Hoßbach memorandum
Most of the doubts which have been raised concern the suspicion that the Allies may have tampered with the text in order to facilitate the task of the prosecution in Nuremberg. Specifically, it has been alleged that objections raised by Blomberg, Fritsch and Neurath to what Hitler proposed were abbreviated 6 .
The text used at Nuremberg was either a true or doctored version of the copy of the original, made by Graf Kirchbach in Liegnitz in November 1943 and entrusted by him to his brother-in-law, Viktor von Martin 7 . No other version of the memorandum is known to have survived the war. It is assumed that the original perished with the files of the highest levels of the War Ministry which were deliberately destroyed just before the capitulationKirchbach's copy was handed over by Martin, according The American prosecution team took steps in September and October to obtain a properly authenticated copy of the original. On 7 September, a telegram was sent from the London office of the American team to their Washington office asking urgently for an authenticated copy of the State Department document, together with Murphy's despatch of 25 May. They already knew of the existence of the copy sent by Murphy, because the Washington office (which had received a copy direct from the State Department), had made a summary of it and on 25 June had sent this summary to the prosecution team in Europe. The summary described the document as »an authenticated copy of the original« and went on »The certification of the authenticity is signed by a colonel of the General Staff whose name is illegible. The original is signed by Col. Hossbach . . .«. It added later »Neither content nor style of the document could justify any doubt concerning its authenticity.« The prosecution team in September asked for a copy of the State Department document on the basis of this summary since it was »bet-ter evidence of original than anything found here.« The telegram added »Also need all details concerning source of same« and accordingly asked for a copy of Murphy's despatch 20 . The State Department responded by sending a copy of the document, authenticated by Acting Secretary Dean Acheson, on 25 September, followed by an identical confirmation by the Secretary of State, himself, James Byrnes, on 17 October. These authentications described the document as »a true photostatic copy of the microfilm« and added that it had been made available to Murphy by the SHAEF G-2 Document section but also claimed, wholly erroneously, that the microfilm was of »the original German Foreign Office record« 21 .
It is not certain why the prosecution team thought that the State Department document would be better evidence than they had already. There are two possible explanations. If the request originated in the London Office without consultation with Paris (or Nuremberg) then it is possible that the officials were working only from the summary they had received from Washington 22 . If on the other hand they had seen Weldon's report was produced at that date simply in order to exclude certain objections allegedly made by Blomberg, Fritsch and Neurath to what Hitler proposed, while leaving other objections by each of them still in the document. When it is recalled that Fritsch had been dead since 1939, it seems even less likely. It is much more plausible that Martin and Kirchbach made these allegations in the 1950's to defend themselves against criticism for having provided the Nuremberg prosecution with a key document. Their dismay was natural since their intention had been apparently to provide evidence for the defence, to show how Hitler's senior professional advisers did not agree with his views. Their argument that these objections had been shortened is therefore understandable but not convincing 25 .
There are, however, two gaps in the evidence which lend an air of plausibility to the theory of a forgery. First, the original of Kirchbach's copy was not used at Nuremberg and has not been found. It is impossible therefore to prove, or to disprove, that it is the immediate parent of the State Department and Foreign Office copies. There are two possible explanations of why it is missing. The first is that it was lost or mis-filed by SHAEF, OSS, the War Office or one of the German document centres. In that case it may still turn up 26 . The alternative explanation is that it was deliberately destroyed to conceal the alleged forgery. Which explanation one adopts obviously depends on how probable one finds the forgery theory in the first place. The second gap in the evidence is that no details were given by SHAEF either to the Foreign Office or to the State Department as to where and when the document was acquired. The available sources do not go further back than Murphy's despatch which refers to it only as a captured document and the film as having been provided »following an inspection of the documents by a member of my staff.« Whether one regards this gap as further evidence of a conspiracy to conceal a forgery or as further inefficiency is again a matter of judgement 27 .
The same applies to the wrong attribution of the document in the authentication by Acheson and Byrnes already noted. Another argument for the forgery theory rests on the discrepancies between the published English texts of the document. These discrepancies undoubtedly exist and in some cases they include serious omissions. But to claim that these discrepancies point to different English drafts of a forgery which inadvertently appeared in print, thus giving the game away, is a trifle esoteric 28 . The files contain references to and copies of several translations. The Foreign Office file refers to a »corrected translation« in the note, dated 11 May, and Weldon refers to a translation from OSS. 31 . In particular, one important omission which has given grounds for suspicion, namely Hitler's reference to the only objection by Neurath recorded in the German text, is already missing in »Glazier«. This no doubt explains why it was also omitted by the American counsel, Sidney Alderman, when he read the document to the court, following the standard procedure 32 . Again this omission can be interpreted either as a deliberate corruption of the text or as a simple error. An error 81 could easily be explained by the fact that both the omitted sentence and the next sentence in the complete English translation in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (and in Annex A) start with the words »In reply to«. If the omission was deliberate, it is very odd that the sentence was retained in both Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression and in the published German text. A typing error seems altogether more likely than a conspiracy at once so Machiavellian and so careless! We consider the arguments that PS-386 was forged by the Allies extremely unconvincing. Of more importance for understanding the memorandum is the question of Hoßbach's motive in making it. Hoßbach was present at the meeting on 5 November 1937 in his capacity as the senior adjutant to the Armed Forces on Hitler's staff. Even after making these important additions to his argument, however, Hoßbach retained some of the sense of his original version that it had not appeared at the time that the 5 November meeting would lead to action in the near future and that he had not considered it then as of any great consequence. Thus in one passage of the published version, he argues that given the general disposition of Hitler's policy (illustrated by his adoption of a two year conscription period in August 1936 rather than a one year period which would have produced reserves faster and would therefore have been sensible had he planned war in the near future) his statement on 5 November was »um so unbegreiflicher«; and Hoßbach adds: »Immerhin hatte ich im Augenblick den Eindruck, daß angesichts des deutlichen Widerstandes Blombergs und Fritschs mit einer tatsäch-lichen Verwirklichung der aggressiven Ziele Hitlers nicht zu rechnen war.« 44 He is also at pains to emphasize that the meeting was not concerned with preparing a concrete plan of campaign but was simply »ein erstmaliges Bekanntmachen der höchsten außen-politischen und militärischen Spitzen mit Zukunftsabsichten Hitlers.«
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There is probably more than one reason for the change in interpretation of the 5 November meeting between the first draft and the published version of Hoßbach's memoirs. No doubt seeing his record of the meeting again eight years later, after all that had happened between, did refresh Hoßbach's memory and suggest a new perspective on his story, in particular the connexion to the Fritsch crisis of January 1938, which he continued to regard as the real turning point in the history of the regime, the moment at which he personally had favoured a military revolt 46 . However, it is also clear that the 5 November meeting was something of an embarrassment to Hoßbach's general ar-83 gument because it did not fit his preferred thesis that there had been no warning of Hitler's aggressive aims before Fritsch was dismissed. He had instead to show that the military leaders' reaction to Hitler's statement on 5 November had been an appropriate one in the circumstances known to them then. Hoßbach's defence, most clearly expressed in the first draft written from memory, is very revealing. For the points he picks out, ostensibly that Hitler described Czechoslovakia as a political goal for the long term and one which must never lead to a European war and, it is implied, one which could only be attained if the French Republic collapsed and when the British Empire was too weak to intervene, were indeed the main issues of concern to the military leadership. Their opposition to Hitler's plans was not against the principle of German expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia but against that expansion being attempted before the armed forces were ready (Beck thought this would be 1940-43 at the earliest) and in a situation which would lead to European war 47 . It was precisely because Hitler's statement on 5 November did not satisfy the military leaders on these points that they objected to it so strongly. If, however, they concluded afterwards that they had succeeded in convincing Hitler of their objections, then it is understandable that they should have put the meeting to the back of their minds since in Hoßbach's words there seemed no danger of a German attack »für die nächste Zukunft« and this had been the chief sticking point for the Generals 48 .
That the military leaders did not oppose Hitler's goal of expansion, so far as Austria and Czechoslovakia were concerned, was not a point which Hoßbach was likely to make explicit in writing immediately after the war but it explains his concentration on the conditions necessary for expansion which had been the subject of the disagreement with Hitler 49 . If we accept that Hitler's statement of foreign policy goals on 5 November deserves to be taken seriously, two questions arise: why did he make it then to that audience and how should one interpret the different parts of his argument? On the first question, the simplest answer has much to recommend it. During 1937 Hitler began to think seriously about how Germany, having re-established its territorial integrity with the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, could go on to the offensive and fulfil the dream of expansion. In that year he had already developed a number of arguments to close party colleagues which he put together in his address on 5 November and revealed for the first time to a group which was not composed of the party faithful (except for Goring) but his service chiefs and Foreign Minister. These were the people whose co-operation he needed to carry out his plans. Britain in a lunch-time conversation on 12 July. He spoke of the weakness of the British Empire which was now unable to strike Italy. He attributed this weakness to poor leadership and in particular the refusal to choose sides. Britain had pursued the wrong policy in the war and in bringing Germany down, and again in Abyssinia. It was now doing the same in Palestine and alienating the Arabs. These remarks show that Hitler was already thinking about the vulnerability of the British Empire along the lines which he was to develop in more detail to the meeting on 5 November 95 .
The same themes recur in Goebbels' record for July to November 1937. Eden made (in Goebbels' view) characteristically stupid attempts to find a compromise over Spain which would suit everyone but his proposals were rejected by the Soviet Union much to Goebbels' satisfaction 96 . Italy and Japan continued their dynamic foreign policy 97 . An
Italian-British rapprochement which Goebbels approved of, since he wanted the friendship of both, came to nothing -Goebbels contrasted Chamberlain's good sense in this policy with Eden's lack of understanding 98 . After war had broken out in the Far East, Goebbels recorded on 3 August that the Führer welcomed the prospect of Japan smashing China as that would then leave Japan free to attack Russia. The Führer had decided to stop German support to China and to apply the same principle to Eastern Europe. In future, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would also be treated with harsh realism. The Führer looked forward to the day when he would take over all of Austria and the same fate was reserved for Czechoslovakia". Hitler deliberately raised Germany's demand for colonies at the Nuremberg party rally in September as a sign that Germany was now strong enough to make its presence felt in the world 10°. The Mussolini visit, which followed at the end of September, was considered a great success although he refused to give the Germans the free hand in Austria which they were hoping for. Nevertheless, according to Goebbels, Hitler was entirely satisfied. Mussolini had acknowledged his need for German support and in return bound himself to Germany for the future. Indeed, he had no choice in view of British hostility towards him 101 . In domestic politics, Goebbels noted Hitler's dissatisfaction with Schacht, which had reached breaking point by November, and Göring's suspicions (shared by Goebbels) of the intentions of the armed forces in wanting to preserve their autonomy 102 .
Goebbels talked to Hitler at midday on 5 November before the meeting recorded by Hoßbach which started at 4.15 p.m. He noted in his diary that Germany was not yet in a position to take action against Czechoslovakia but that the Czechs faced revisionist powers on all sides and would not be able to resist their combined strength. The Führer was encouraging Polish ambitions against the Czechs. Goebbels also noted that the campaign on the colonial issue should be moderated in case the public came to expect immediate results which the Government was not yet in a position to deliver. He referred to the proposed visit by Lord Halifax and added, reflecting Hitler's views, that Halifax's purpose was probably to divide the Axis and that in this it would fail. Goebbels had also discussed Schacht with Hitler and they were agreed that Schacht should resign although the Führer wanted to postpone the announcement until after the commemoration of the anniversary of the Munich Putsch on 9 November. The entry ends with the note that Hitler had a meeting with his service chiefs in the afternoon 103 .
This entry confirms the view that Hitler did not have an immediate operation in mind against Czechoslovakia on 5 November though he thought Czechoslovakia's position was untenable. The comment that Germany was not yet in a position to take action may have been a result of the warnings Hitler had received about the way the rearmament programme was falling behind, in contrast with his earlier optimism. On the other hand, it could also reflect his calculations about the opportunities that would exist if and when general war should break out in the Mediterranean. The diary entry also confirms that the Halifax visit was on his mind and that he viewed it with scepticism, and that he was still occupied with the dismissal of Schacht. Despite Hitler's suspicion, Goebbels still hoped that the Halifax visit would be a success and that it would be possible to have the friendship of both Britain and Italy. But this was a vain hope. On 25 November, Hitler gave him a full account of how he had outwitted Halifax. Hitler forced Halifax to take the lead in the discussion by speaking as little as possible. He had thus defeated Halifax's purpose of persuading him to reveal his hand. Hitler raised no demands at all so that now the British were completely nonplussed. The next day Hitler returned to the subject arguing that the British were only interested in negotiations on their terms which were not acceptable to Germany. The British, he said, offered colonies, but not their own colonies, and only on condition that Germany accept a final settlement of its revisionist claims and rejoin the League. The British also offered an understanding on Central Europe and Danzig but, so far as Hitler was concerned, Britain had no right to interfere in these areas. There was therefore no basis for negotiations along the lines offered by Halifax 104 . The negative view of Britain prevailed in the remaining diary entries for 1937. Goebbels condemned renewed Franco-British talk of meeting Germany's colonial demands in return for disarmament and return to the League 105 . On 12 December he recorded the Italian decision to leave the League, contrasting the successful partnership of the Axis powers with the discomfiture of the British and French democracies.
The value of the Goebbels diaries as a source for 1935-37 derives from his closeness to Hitler, who enjoyed his company and talked freely to him. Hitler was not committed to everything he said -his remarks about Poland and Hungary for instance were revised as the international situation developed. But certain themes are central and recurrent: his hopes for expansion East, his growing concentration on the initial objective, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and his disappointment with and distrust of Britain. Hitler did not share all his thoughts with Goebbels. Military planning and the detailed direction of foreign policy did not concern the Minister of Propaganda. Goebbels' account is also no doubt coloured by his own views, for instance his dislike of Ribbentrop and his hope that all would be well in the end with Britain. Goebbels was also not privy to all the secrets of the internal power game and he did not see through the conspiracy against Fritsch in January-February 1938 106 . However, the diaries do provide a vivid record of Hitler's thinking on foreign affairs and touch on many of the themes which he brought together on 5 November. Perhaps because it caused Goebbels anxiety, the development of Hitler's view of Britain emerges particularly clearly. By 1937 Hitler had come to see Britain as a weakened power, clinging to a concept of its place in the world which was out of date. Its claim to arbitrate in Eastern Europe was an anachronism. Its attempts to entice Germany back to the League by promises of colonial concessions at others' expense were a sham. By the time of the Halifax visit, Hitler's view is one of scorn. Let Britain become enmeshed in the tangled web of its own weaving; it would not catch Germany with its wiles and had no power to stop Germany.
IV. The Dertinger and Kausch reports
Long familiar to historians but yet to receive the critical study they deserve are the confidential reports of certain German journalists to provide background information for their editors. Based both on official press conferences (particularly those organized by the Propaganda Ministry) and on the journalists' own sources at home and abroad, these reports form a valuable supplement to the Goebbels diaries. Two journalists who provided exceptionally detailed information were Georg Dertinger and Dr. Hans Joachim Kausch. They worked for a collective of provincial newspapers, including The press was instructed not to mention the Neurath visit after it had been cancelled, even when the invitation was repeated, and this was on the »allerhöchste« (i. e. the Führer's) order. Again in August when it was suggested that to strengthen Chamberlain against Eden the Neurath visit might be revived, Dertinger predicted that German policy would rather be determined by the Führer's »größtem Vorbehalt« towards English gestures of friendliness which he saw as »scheinheilig und unehrlich« m .
Pressure In The inclusion of Neurath in the meeting on 5 November, which would not have been necessary had the meeting simply been concerned with rearmament, was probably because Hitler was well aware that Neurath did not share these views. Hitler hoped either to win him over or possibly (as Raeder later suggested) to provoke his resignation 157 .
Neurath had recently adopted positions which were unwelcome to Hitler both over Italy and Britain. He had opposed the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact to Italy which was to be concluded by Ribbentrop Their fears had no doubt been heightened by the British rearmament programme whose importance had been recognized by the German military attache in London, Geyr von Schweppenburg. Geyr had no doubt that Britain considered Germany its most dangerous potential enemy and that British rearmament, which he described as »ohne Vorgang in der englischen Friedensgeschichte«, was aimed primarily against Germany 163 . In his last report from London, dated 20 September 1937, he argued that up to the end of 1938, when British air and naval rearmament would be substantially complete, it might be possible for Germany to score some successes without precipitating war. During this period economic or even territorial concessions might be negotiated, but it was unlikely that Germany would be allowed decisive military superiority in Europe. In the event of war with Britain and France, Germany might also be successful for a time but, Geyr emphasized, once British air and naval forces could protect the motherland and sea routes, »Es ist nicht möglich, einen Krieg gegen das britische Reich zu gewinnen [...]« According to Geyr, Fritsch went through this report with him line by line but Blomberg, who had the previous December encouraged him to talk frankly to Hitler (while preferring not to do so himself) avoided seeing him 164 .
Blomberg, although lacking the character to stand up to Hitler, tried to promote good relations with Britain. He had been chosen as the German representative to the Coronation and seems to have thought that he had been given a serious mission to improve relations between the two countries, telling Eden that he was acting on definite instructions from Hitler. He must have been disconcerted to discover on his return that Hitler was more interested in Mussolini's reaction and that he was to be dispatched immediately to Rome to make up for his trip to London. According to Hoßbach, Blomberg was extremely angry at the way his London visit had been discredited and said he would not accept another mission 165 .
Blomberg 
General Goring.
The only member of Hitler's audience on 5 November with roots in the Nazi party was General Goring. Despite his close personal and political ties to the Führer, however, Goring does not appear to have shared Hitler's ambition for a racial reconstruction of Europe. His background and outlook were rather those of a traditional nationalist and his aim was concentrated on establishing a German national state in Central Europe with a South East European bloc of dependent states to supply the economic deficiencies of the Reich. It is possible to see in this goal also the preparation of a launching pad against the Soviet Union. Certainly anti-Communism was the heart of Göring's ideology and the economic resources of the Soviet Union were no doubt attractive to him. But unlike Hitler he does not appear to have seen conquest of the Soviet Union as a racial imperative 173 . He also took the danger of British and French intervention against In his insistence on the price, Goring was probably reflecting both his own hopes of what would be possible and the pressure which arose from Hitler's impatience with Britain. Christie was also able to discover, however, the economic reasons for Göring's concern about Anglo-German relations. As director of the Four Year Plan, he knew that Germany could not survive a long war 181 . As Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, he also knew at first hand the serious effect of steel shortages on air rearmament. His State Secretary, Erhard Milch, in a report for the rearmament discussion on 5 November, argued that the shortfall in iron and steel would set back some aspects of the programme for the next five years by as much as a further five years 182 . This made the increasing influence of pro-Italian party »radicals« on Hitler all the more dangerous. Göring's comments to Christie on this score at the Nuremberg party rally in September 1937 may well have betrayed his real fears. 186 . Goring was also disingenuous in his remarks to Christie, implying that he like Schacht was opposed to the policy of autarchy whereas in fact he was manoeuvering to take over from Schacht; similarly he implied that he sided with the army command against the party radicals, at the same time as he was complaining to Goebbels about the army's influence and aspiring to replace Blomberg himself. However, Göring's unscrupulous intrigues do not affect the reasons for thinking that he disagreed with the policy Hitler laid out on 5 November 1937. Hitler who had no desire to strengthen Göring's position further and who was aware of Göring's reservations about the pro-Italian course outmanoeuvered him by assuming personal command of the armed forces himself 189 . Göring's promotion to Field
Marshal was a sop to hide the fact that he had been passed over. The simultaneous promotion of Ribbentrop to Foreign Minister signalled the future limits of Göring's influence over foreign policy.
Ribbentrop
Ribbentrop's influence, which was feared by all Hitler's audience on 5 November, can be assessed by comparing Hitler's views with the two long reports which Ribbentrop sent from London on 21 May and 28 December 1937. These reports, copies of which he sent direct to Hitler, chart his failure to achieve the aim with which Hitler had sent him to London in August 1936, namely, »Ribbentrop, bringen Sie mir das englische Bündnis!« Instead, they develop the opposite policy of building a bloc against Britain 190 .
In his first report at the time of the Coronation, Ribbentrop commented on the use of the Crown as the unifying symbol of the Empire and Britain's determination to bind the Empire closer together by rearmament: »Man wird daher für die nächsten Jahre eher mit einer Stärkung als mit einer Schwächung der Struktur des britischen Imperiums zu rechnen haben.« 191 He noted the friendliness of the new Prime Minister,
Chamberlain, but he did not expect any change in the basic principles of British foreign policy. These were the desire »als saturierte Nation« for peace above all, a bad conscience about the treatment of Germany, while Germany's new power, its anti-Russian stand, the problems of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (which were coming to a head) and its good relations with Italy and Japan made Germany appear a probable aggressor. For its defence, Britain no longer relied on collective security: it would resist attack by Germany on France or Belgium; and although it would not commit itself in the East, the danger existed that it would be drawn into a Russo-German war by its guarantee to France. Ribbentrop hoped that faced with the alternative of a German guarantee of British interests or »nochmaliger Kampf auf Leben und Tod« Britain would make the right choice. However, the Foreign Office still argued that, »Wenn Deutschland in einem russischen Krieg siegreich bliebe, wäre es so stark, daß es mit Europa und dann auch eines Tages mit England machen könne, was ihm beliebe.« The Embassy was making progress in overcoming this attitude but Ribbentrop recommended that »in absehbarer Zeit« Britain should be asked to declare her intentions towards »den deutschen Lebensnotwendigkeiten«. If the result was negative »so ist der Beweis des englischen Einkreisungswillens gegen Deutschland erbracht und man wird dann kompromißlos die notwendigen Konsequenzen ziehen müssen« 192 .
It is noticeable that Ribbentrop talked openly of German conflict with Russia, suggesting that he was responding directly to Hitler's ideas of expansion against the Soviet Union. He was quite candid about German ambitions in his soundings in London. He told Churchill in 1937 that German aims in the East included (in Churchill's words) »Poland and the Danzig Corridor« and that »White Russia and the Ukraine were indispensable«. When Churchill objected that the British Government would not agree to such expansion, Ribbentrop replied: »In that case, war is inevitable. There is no way out. The Fuehrer is resolved. Nothing will stop him and nothing will stop us.«
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The failure of Ribbentrop's mission in London led him to advocate the alternative policy of building up the Anti-Comintern Pact as a counter-weight to the British Empire. This was the central message of his second, lengthy report drawn up in December 1937. In October, he had won Hitler's support for the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact to Italy against Auswärtiges Amt resistance. He may have hoped that this would be the spring board for Hitler to confirm a promise that he would become Foreign Minister when Neurath reached the age of 65, at the beginning of February 1938. If so, his strategy appeared in December to have failed, because Hitler was annoyed that he had failed to keep Neurath informed about the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was under these circumstances that he drew up the December report, which he is alleged to have intended to offer Hitler as his political testament together with his resignation 194 .
In this report 195 , Ribbentrop argued that Britain considered Germany its most dangerous potential opponent, and that it was countering the joint threat of Japan, Italy and Germany by its »gewaltiges Aufrüstungsprogramm« and improving its links with the United States, while at the same time the needs of air defence were tying Britain ever more closely to France 196 . The main question for Britain remained, however, whether it could reach an agreement with Germany to preserve peace and therefore the Empire. Ribbentrop thought there might be members of the Government (though he doubted whether they included Chamberlain or Halifax) who still believed in the possibility of an agreement with Germany along the following lines: return of some German colonies, acceptance of a peaceful Anschluß with Austria and improvement of the lot of the Sudeten Germans up to the point of cultural autonomy, in return for Germany accepting non-aggression pacts with its neighbours and limitation on air rearmament on the model of the Anglo-German naval treaty. This, however, was the limit to which those favourably disposed towards Germany would go. Within the political elite, the Foreign Office still had a decisive influence with its argument that German force should be opposed by force and its systematic attempts to encircle Germany. Even those who wanted to explore an agreement with Germany were sceptical, but thought it would buy time in which Germany's economic difficulties might force it to greater moderation. Chamberlain had been under pressure from this second group and having failed in his initial policy of dividing Germany, Italy and Japan, he had been forced to agree to Halifax's visit. Italy's involvement in the Mediterranean, the future changes in the balance of force as other powers rearmed and the timetable for expansion which this indicated, were the themes which most concerned his audience. Hitler's views differed from theirs and also from Ribbentrop's. They dreaded Britain's intervention in a European war and therefore continued to believe in the need for understanding with Britain. Hitler dismissed both the chance of understanding with Britain and the danger of British intervention. This enabled him to answer the vital question of how German expansion could succeed, a question to which the professional diplomats and military leadership had no real answer since they knew that Britain was not likely to agree to the kind of European settlement Germany wanted quickly, if at all, and they also accepted that in time the Empire and its allies (including the United States) would be too strong for Germany. Goring was more optimistic at this stage about reaching agreement with Britain but also saw no viable alternative. Even Ribbentrop believed it would be necessary to establish a German bloc superior to the British Empire before a conflict could be risked.
Hitler brushed aside their fears and hopes and supplied his own answer: early expansion by force with lightning speed while Italy and, if possible, France and Britain were involved in the Mediterranean, and in any case before Germany's enemies were ready. The reasons which led Hitler to this conclusion and to the decision to face his audience with it on 5 November were many and varied. But the key was his sense that a crucial opportunity for expansion lay within Germany's grasp. If Germany were to seize the opportunity, however, then rearmament had to be completed on time. At this point Hitler's ideas and the occasion of the meeting on 5 November came together, for the serious deficiencies in the rearmament programme (which prompted the meeting) had to be put right, if Hitler's plans were to be realized.
A further assumption, partly hidden, may also have been important. For Hitler, Czech-106 oslovakia and Austria were simply the first stage: they would constitute the foundation from which the racial wars for continental and perhaps even world hegemony would be launched. For his audience on 5 November, on the other hand, with the partial exception of Goring, Austria and Czechoslovakia were themselves the crucial goal.
Hitler did not dwell on this difference in his statement, but its existence may have made him even more hostile to negotiations. If Chamberlain were to succeed in convincing the German people of Britain's support for their legitimate aspirations, based on selfdetermination, and distinguishing them from Hitler's quest for living space, popular support for Hitler's war would be much harder to achieve. Other considerations re-enforced Hitler's desire for action: concern about living standards, public opinion and his health. In November, he also finally decided to grasp the nettle of Schacht's resignation because Schacht would not submit to the economic preparations for war which Hitler had authorized Goring to carry out. This made it natural for Hitler to use the 5 November meeting, which arose directly from disputes over the rearmament programme, to clarify his disagreement with Schacht and ensure that he retained the support of his other professional advisers. For all these reasons, Hitler decided to confront them with a solemn statement, which was prepared in advance and took over two hours to deliver, a statement he described as »das Ergebnis eingehender Überlegungen und der Erfahrungen seiner viereinhalbjährigen Regierungszeit« containing »seine grundlegenden Gedanken über die Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten und -notwendigkeiten unserer außenpolitischen Lage« and he asked that it should be considered as his testament in the event of his death 200 .
He may have hoped to win them over, not only by the force of his oratory and the fact that he claimed to have an answer to the problem of German expansion, where they had none, but also through the warning example of Schacht. His audience was unconvinced and tried in various ways to dissuade him. The Generals prepared new military plans which turned Hitler's assumption that a general European war could be avoided into a condition, thus they hoped postponing action perhaps indefinitely. Neurath tried unsuccessfully to persuade Hitler that what he wanted could be achieved peacefully in time. Goring intensified his pressure on Austria, perhaps to show Hitler that peaceful gains were still possible with British acquiescence and despite Italian objections. Only Raeder accepted the logic of what Hitler said as far as the navy was concerned, and planned as fast as he was able for the capacity to deter Britain from war, or if the worst should happen, for war with Britain. The objections of his audience did not change Hitler's mind though he did not contradict them directly, apart from his interview with Neurath in January. Instead, and characteristically, the Führer waited for a crisis to enable him to impose his solution. The chance came at the end of January 1938 with the revelations about Blomberg's wife. This was it seems a genuine blow to Hitler who had probably assumed that he could always bend the pliable Blomberg to his will in the last resort 201 . But the conspiracy against Fritsch, Hitler's assumption of command in place of Blomberg, the replacement of Neurath by Ribbentrop, were all signals of a radical course which was confirmed by his renewed commitment to crush Czechoslovakia in 1938. He was not deflected even when he was forced to accept that he had underestimated Britain's willingness to go to war, which required a fresh analysis of how British military power could be excluded from the continent 202 . The 5 November meeting was not the final expression of Hitler's tactics, but he never wavered on the principles -that Germany must expand and take the best chance of expanding without general war. Nor was the 5 November meeting the only occasion on which Hitler expressed views of this kind, as Goebbels' diary shows. Indeed the consistency of the views he expressed to Goebbels and through the mouthpiece of Dietrich with parts of Hoßbach's record is striking. The significance of the 5 November meeting is that on this occasion he tried to impose his views on his most senior advisers and was met with scepticism rather than the uncritical adulation to which he was accustomed from party audiences. Hoßbach's record was itself a product of this scepticism. It remains a crucial dividing line in the history of the Führer state. (London, 1977) , p. 141. Kluge, Das Hoßbach-»ProtokolU (see above, fn 6), p. 46 argues that a microfilm was used in order to conceal the forgery. The use of microfilm was not, however, a unique procedure adopted for the Hoßbach memorandum. In a meeting of representatives of the British and American prosecution teams in London on 24 October 1945, it was noted that the Foreign Office had photostats of a number of documents »made from micro-film of the originals sent to London by a joint British-American micro-film unit«. The originals were described as being »in American hands in Germany« (PRO, FO 1019/90). Kluge, Das Hoßbach-»Protokoll« (see above, fn 6), p. 31, Henrikson, »Das Nürnberger Dokument 386-PS« (see above, fn 6), p. 165. The most likely explanation for their error is that Kirchbach's signature did not show up in the photostatic copy from the National Archives which they used. The State Department copy has two marginal notations: on page 3 »Einsatz« has been suggested for »Ansatz« in the text and on page 6 »Macht?« has been suggested instead of »Mit« in »Mitzuwachs« in the text. Clearly the reader thought in both cases that his suggestions would make better sense than the original. The Foreign Office copy has a number of marginal lines, presumably indicating passages the reader thought of particular interest. A reason for thinking that they were working from a transcript not a photocopy is that Weldon made no reference to Kirchbach's certification, referring only to Hoßbach as a possible lead for further evidence. The English translation of 386-PS, attached to Weldon's report, does carry Kirchbach's certification and identifies him correctly but this may have been attached to Weldon's report later, perhaps replacing the document he worked from, since the translation is itself certified by E. Glazier with the date 14 November 1945 (whereas Weldon's report is dated 1 September). Interestingly, one of the English translations in the Foreign Office file (headed »Annex A«) does not carry any reference to Kirchbach's certification, and ends with Hoßbach's name. Weldon may therefore have been using that, or a similar, translation and transcript. (Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (see above, fn 10), p. 141, assumes that the prosecution team only had the summary from the Washington Office until they asked for the State Department document on 7 September. This could only apply to the London office, however, since Weldon's report is dated 1 September and clearly refers to a complete document from OSS, not a summary.) Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (see above, fn 10), p. Smith's book (1977) but a check of appropriate folders kindly undertaken for the present authors by staff of the National Archives revealed no evidence of the Hoßbach memorandum and no mention of it. The files of X-2, OSS are in process of being transferred from the CIA to the National Archives. Again, no information about the Hoßbach memorandum has been found in those received so far. (We are grateful to Mr Wilbert Mahoney of the National Archives for his assistance.) If the original was sent to the War Office in London, it may still be in the files of one of the intelligence sections which are closed to research. There is an illuminating description of arrangements for the handling of documents and of the confusion caused by the competition of different agencies at the end of the war in an official account of the Military Intelligence Research Section (PRO, WO 208/3237). The Imperial War Museum contains a negative print (white on black) of Kirchbach's copy among its Nuremberg trial papers (FO 645, Box 181) . Some words on this print are difficult to read and they correspond to notes about uncertain readings on a transcript of the memorandum in the Foreign Office file, suggesting that this document may have been used first before the positive print (black on white) was received from SHAEF (AL 2662). We are grateful to Mr Κ. Η. M. Duke, formerly a member of the British War Crimes Executive and of the editorial team of Documents on German Foreign Policy, for pointing out that the negative print was probably the first stage in the photographic copying process.
A partial explanation for the omission of any reference to the source of the document may be the very early date at which it came into Allied hands. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division of the American Prosecution team which kept systematic records of source and acquisition of other documents was only set up in July 1945. See the affidavit of Major William H. Coogan, dated 19 November 1945, on the procedures adopted for processing the documents for the trials in NCA, vol. Ill (see above, fn 18), pp. 1-4.
Kluge, »Das Hoßbach->Protokoll<« (see above, fn 1), pp. 24-30, 46. The discrepancies were also commented on by Henrikson, »Das Nürnberger Dokument« (see above, fn 6), pp. 169-70, 177-78. NCA, vol. I (see above, fn 18), p. XIII; Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918 -1945 1 and 7 (ibid., pp. 177-78) . IMT, II (see above, fn 1), p. 273. Alderman himself noted as he read out the document that the translation did not appear to make sense in two places, one of which did indeed result from faulty translation caused by the omission of another line of the German text. Ibid., pp. 263, 272. The line in question is missing from both »Annex A« and »Glazier« suggesting that either one influenced the other or that they were both influenced by a common parent. There is nothing suspicious about this omission: it simply made nonsense of the passage in both IMT (English version) and NCA-See Henrikson's Reference No. 7 (Henrikson, »Das Nürnberger Dokument« [see above, fn 6], pp. . Friedrich Hoßbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934 (Wolfenbüttel and Hannover, 1949 , pp. 9, 124-36. A second edition without significant alterations was published in Göttingen in 1965. Page references in this article are to the first edition which is compared with earlier drafts. Ibid., 157. Ibid., Hoßbach, »Ein Beitrag zur Wahrheit«, 23. 9. 1946 (BA-MA Ν 24/98) . It seems more likely that the text was obtained from a source at the Nuremberg trials. The printed text contains some discrepancies from the IMT German version, including the omission of 2 lines, presumably due to imperfect transcription. 
